

HK *ended to Walters*

9/28/71

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

*[TS- HK-AA 384]*

DOS Review Completed

Instructions for General Walters

1. On September 29, General Walters should hand over the attached oral message to the Chinese.

With respect to the first paragraph of this message, he should make the following informal comment:

"The presence of advance personnel on this trip is important to enable technical planning to begin and to guarantee its responsiveness to political objectives."

General Walters should then tell the Chinese that he has been informed that he will receive by October 1 information for the Chinese concerning Foreign Minister Gromyko's conversation with the President on September 29. He will be prepared to pass this information to the Chinese on October 2.

General Walters should also inform the Chinese that he returned to Washington from September 24 to September 28 for consultations with Dr. Kissinger.

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ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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-2-

2. On October 2, General Walters should give the Chinese the following information orally:

"The talks between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko covered the following subjects: general US-Soviet relations, SALT, Berlin and other European issues, the Middle East, and South Asia. Foreign Minister Gromyko invited Dr. Kissinger to tea on September 30 during which some of the same ground was covered.

"Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to give Prime Minister Chou En-lai a full rundown of these discussions.

"The only item that requires immediate attention by the Chinese side is that Foreign Minister Gromyko conveyed a formal invitation from the Soviet leaders to President Nixon to visit the Soviet Union. The United States Government will keep the Government of the People's Republic of China informed about its reaction to this invitation. As previously affirmed to the Chinese side, the United States will under no circumstances agree to a Presidential visit to the Soviet Union that would take place before the President's visit to the People's Republic of China."

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1. As agreed by the Chinese side the U.S. will release the announcement of Dr. Kissinger's return visit at the White House on October 5, 1000 Washington time. There will be no press conference but a few technical background questions will have to be answered. It would be very desirable to have the Chinese views about the composition of the American group by then. The transcript of the background press briefing will be transmitted to the Chinese side immediately after the briefing is given.

2. While detailed arrangements and agenda can be left until Dr. Kissinger's arrival, it is important for the Chinese side to understand that the effectiveness of the discussions depends on their being conducted along the lines Dr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Huang on September 13: restricted meetings conducted by Dr. Kissinger and one aide on the U.S. side; broader meetings for more general expositions and subsidiary political issues; and technical discussions. The composition of the Chinese group for each meeting is of course entirely up to the Chinese side.

3. As for the discussions during President Nixon's visit to China, the President fully stands behind the announcement of July 15 as well as the conversations between Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Kissinger. This was reaffirmed in the U.S. oral note presented July 19; in President Nixon's press conference of August 4; and in

- 2 -

President Nixon's answer to a question at the Economic Club of Detroit on September 23: "What I am trying to do is open a dialogue and move towards more normal relations." Dr. Kissinger on September 13 indicated to Ambassador Huang that the agenda of his July meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai could serve as the basic agenda for President Nixon's visit as well. Prime Minister Chou En-lai will remember that Dr. Kissinger was explicit about what was and what was not possible, and in what time frame. The President affirms these understandings once again. At the same time, certain subsidiary measures are desirable, not as a substitute for the main agenda but to contribute to a climate in which the principal objectives can be realized. This is not a diversion, but rather constitutes an attempt to facilitate the progress in Chinese-U.S. relations which many have an interest in preventing. For its part, the U.S. side stresses that the improvement of Chinese-U.S. relations is a cardinal element of President Nixon's foreign policy which will be carried out energetically and in good faith. Progress requires a degree of mutual confidence.